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The information security field experiences a continuous stream of information security 
incidents and breaches, which are publicised by the media, public bodies and regulators.  
Despite the need for information security practices being recognised and in existence for some 
time the underlying general information security affecting tasks and causes of these incidents 
and breaches are not consistently understood, particularly with regard to human error.  This 
paper analyses recent published incidents and breaches to establish the proportions of human 
error, and where possible subsequently utilises the HEART human reliability analysis 
technique, which is established within the safety field.  This analysis provides an 
understanding of the proportions of incidents and breaches that relate to human error as well as 
the common types of tasks that result in these incidents and breaches through adoption of 
methods applied within the safety field.     
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1. Introduction 
The ICO data security incident trends (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2017) shows that 
a number of UK sectors have experienced significant increases in reported information 
security incidents in Q4 2017.  In some sectors such as the health sector this is primarily due 
to incidents that relate to people and human error.  Despite this the information security 
community does not have a thorough understanding of what constitutes a human error and 
often resorts to general basic awareness or training on information security following an 
incident rather than dealing with the causal factors (Mahfuth et al., 2017).  Current practices 
fall short of identifying the actual root cause of human error related information security 
incidents even though people are recognized as being the weakest link in information security 
controls (Furnell et al., 2018; Halevi et al., 2017; Mahfuth et al., 2017; Metalidou et al., 2014; 
Parsons et al., 2017).  There are also no established human error information security 
frameworks in practice to enable not only effective resolution of human error related 
information security incidents but also the prevention of these events.   
The motivation for this research is to establish the volumes and causes of publicised 
information security incidents and breaches that relate to human error and where possible map 
to the established Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) human 
reliability analysis method, which is widely utilised within the safety field. 
This research provides original contribution to knowledge through the analysis of recent 
public sector information security incidents and breaches in order to understand the 
proportions that relate to human error as well as the common generic task types (GTT), as 
defined within the HEART (Williams, 1992) technique, and general information security 
affecting tasks (GISAT) (Evans et al., 2018) that lead to these events. The research also 
supports the applicability of the HEART human reliability analysis technique within the 
information security field. 
The remainder of paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents related research into the 
human factor of information security.  Section 3 provides an overview of the method applied 
for the research into published information security incidents and breaches and section 4 
presents the results of the research.  Section 5 delivers the key findings and section 6 
concludes the research and outlines future work. 
2. Related Work 
There have been many research articles published on the topic of information security but 
proportionally very few articles dedicated to the human factor and specifically human error.  
In our previous research (Evans et al., 2016) we emphasised this gap in current research and 
also emphasised the need for empirical research into human error effects on information 
security assurance to understand the underlying causes of human error.  Human error is 
defined as non-deliberate, unintentional or accidental cause of poor information security 
(Werlinger et al., 2009).  Amongst published articles human error is identified as being 
associated with a large proportion of information security incidents or breaches (Komatsu et 
al., 2013; Stewart and Jürjens, 2017) and the most critical factor in the management of 
information security (Stewart and Jürjens, 2017).  Literature has consistently presented that 
effective information security management must essentially embrace the human factor in 
addition to technology (Asai and Hakizabera, 2010; Frangopoulos et al., 2014; Stewart and 
Jürjens, 2017; Werlinger et al., 2009) and that the security of IT systems and platforms have 
been undermined by human failings (Lacey, 2010). 
Human error quantification has varied in published literature.  Frangopoulos et al (Komatsu et 
al., 2013) presented that 42 percent of security incidents resulted from human error whereas 
Stewart (Stewart and Jürjens, 2017) stated 65 percent were due to some forms of human error.  
Alavi et al (Alavi et al., 2016) presented research, which found that 64 percent of security 
incidents were directly related to human error.  Whereas Asai and Hakizabera (Asai and 
Hakizabera, 2010) stated in their research that 80 percent of information security breaches are 
caused by human error.  The information security field should study methods used within the 
safety field (Lacey, 2010) where it was found that 90 percent of accidents were caused by 
human failure. It was also presented that new interventions are required to change human 
behaviour (Lacey, 2010) and that few information security practitioners have an understanding 
of proven methodologies for changing human behaviour.  It was also stated that factors such 
as stress, lack of training or supervision, and bad system or process design are the underlying 
causes of breaches (Lacey, 2010) and also that information security management remains 
relatively weak in conducting root cause analysis of minor incidents.  
 
3. Method 
The method employed by this research was to understand the proportions of human error 
related incidents from published public sector incidents and personal data breaches by the UK 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and the UK National Health Service (NHS).  As 
there is greater incident detail published for the NHS personal data breaches we were able to 
use a set of GISATs to map the breaches to, in order to provide a richer level of understanding 
regarding the specific tasks that were being performed when the incident occurred.  Once the 
GISATs were established we were subsequently able to map to the HEART GTTs. 
HEART was initially published in 1985 and used by numerous organisations and sectors as a 
mechanism to address the issue of human reliability (Williams, 1992).  HEART has been 
widely used in industry, primarily the nuclear industry (Chandler et al., 2006; Lyons et al., 
2004).  A detailed HEART user manual (Williams, 1992) was written in 1992 for Nuclear 
Electric plc, now EDF Energy.  The HEART method comprises of a set of 9 GTTs as shown 
in table 1 with associated nominal human unreliability and upper bounds and also 38 error 
producing conditions (EPC) and their accompanying strength values.  The GTTs are a core 
component of the HEART technique which looks to match the task under consideration with a 
predefined list of task descriptions. 
A 
Totally unfamiliar task, performed at speed with no real idea of the likely 
consequences of actions taken. 
B 
Shift or restore system to a new or original state at a single attempt without 
supervision or procedures. 
C Complex task requiring a high level of understanding and skill. 
D Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given insufficient or inadequate attention. 
E Routine, highly-practiced, rapid task involving relatively low level of skill. 
F 
Restore or shift a system to original or new state following procedures, with some 
checking. 
G 
Completely familiar, well designed, highly practiced routine task occurring 
several times per hour, performed to highest possible standards by highly 
motivated, highly trained and experienced persons, totally aware of implications 
of failure, with time to correct potential error, but without the benefit of 
significant job aids. 
H 
Respond correctly to system command even when there is an assisting or 
automated supervisory system providing accurate interpretation of system state. 
M Miscellaneous task for which no description can be found. 
Table 1 – HEART GTTs (Williams, 1992) 
The Q4 2017 incident trends published by the ICO (Information Commissioner’s Office, 
2017) were analysed to ascertain a greater degree of understanding of the proportions of 
human error related information security incidents.  In addition to analysis of the ICO data, 
security trend analysis was also performed on the published NHS serious incidents requiring 
investigation (SIRI) level 2 incidents relating to Q3  2017 (Department of Health, 2017).  
Further analysis of the incidents was conducted by mapping each of the 124 human error 
related SIRI level 2 incidents to a set of General Information Security Affecting Tasks 
(GISAT), which subsequently enabled the mapping to the HEART GTTs.  The GISATs were 
developed during our wider research and empirical feasibility study into 12 months of reported 
information security incidents within public and private sector organisations.   
The primary focus of this research was public sector incidents and breaches but also undertook 
analysis of combined data for all sectors, including private sector, to enable a holistic set of 
results.  In order to enable the analysis to be performed and establish which incidents were 
likely, possibly or unlikely related to human error, we developed the mapping below based 





Data left in insecure 
location 
Likely The data would likely be left by a person 
unintentionally 
Data posted/faxed to 
incorrect recipient 
Likely The data would likely be posted or faxed to 
the wrong recipient unintentionally 
Data sent by email to 
incorrect recipient 
Likely The data would likely be emailed to the 
wrong recipient unintentionally 
Failure to redact data Likely The data would likely be redacted 
unintentionally  
Failure to use bcc 
when sending email 
Likely The failure to use bcc would likely be 
unintentional   
Insecure disposal of 
hardware 
Possibly The insecure disposal of hardware could be 
technical, procedural or possibly human error 
Insecure disposal of 
paperwork 
Possibly The insecure disposal of paperwork could be 
technical, procedural or possibly human error 
Loss/theft of only 
copy of encrypted 
data 
Possibly The category covers both loss of equipment 
,which is likely to be unintentional human 
error, but also mainly theft of equipment 
which is unlikely to be human error 
Loss/theft of 
paperwork 
Likely The category covers both mainly loss of 
paperwork which is likely to be unintentional 
human error but also infrequent theft of 




Possibly The category covers both loss of equipment, 
which is likely to be unintentional human 
error, but also mainly theft of equipment 
which is unlikely to be human error 
Other principle 7 
failure 
Possibly This is a broad category and incidents could 
possibly be as a result of unintentional human 
error 
Verbal disclosure Likely The data would likely be disclosed by a 
person unintentionally 
Cyber incidents Unlikely The cyber incident category tends to relate to 
malicious or intentional acts so is unlikely to 
be human error 
Table 2 – Mapping of ICO data security incident categories to human error likelihood 
 
4. Results 
The results of the analysis of the published public sector (Central and Local Government and 
Health) personal data breaches and NHS SIRI level 2 incidents are presented in the tables and 
figures below.   
The analysis of published personal data breaches by the ICO for all sectors can be shown in 
table 3 and figure 1.  It was established that 64% of the incidents were likely to be as a result 
of human error and that a further 27% could possibly be as a result of human error.  Therefore, 
combining both categories provides a view that 91% of all personal data breaches reported to 






Likely 521 63.92 
Possibly 220 26.99 
Unlikely 74 9.07 
 
 
Table 3 – Human error likelihood of ICO 
data security incident trends for all sectors 
Figure 1 – Likelihood of human error ICO 
data security incident trends for all sectors 
The analysis was also performed on specific central government, local government and health 
sectors.  The analysis found that incidents were likely to relate to human error for these three 
sectors between 70% and 82%.  However, taking into account the possible human errors the 
percentages increased significantly.  This accumulation found that data security incidents 
relating to human error was possibly 96% for central government and 98% for both local 
government and health sectors. 





Likely 20 80 
Possibly 4 16 
Unlikely 1 4 
 
 
Table 4 – Human error likelihood of ICO data 
security incident trends for central 
government 
Figure 2 – Likelihood of human error ICO 
data security incident trends for central 
government 





Likely 76 81.72 
Possibly 15 16.12 
Unlikely 2 2.15 
 
 
Table 5 – Human error likelihood of ICO data 
security incident trends for local government 
Figure 3 – Likelihood of human error ICO 







Likely 199 69.09 
Possibly 84 29.16 
Unlikely 5 1.73 
 
 
Table 6 – Human error likelihood of ICO data 
security incident trends for health 
Figure 4 – Likelihood of human error ICO 
data security incident trends for health 
Each of the 148 reported NHS SIRI incidents and associated details were analysed and it was 
identified that 124 (84%) of the most serious NHS personal data security incidents pertained to 
human error.   




Yes 124 83.8 
No 24 16.2 
 
 
Table 7 – NHS SIRI level 2 incidents Figure 5 – Proportion of human error for 
NHS SIRI 2 incidents 
This analysis of the Q3 2017 NHS SIRI level 2 incidents found that 42 (34%) were posting an 
item or information, 31 (25%) were sending an email, and 22 (18%) were safeguarding 
information or equipment.  We were able to manually map each incident to the list of GISATs 
using the rich details published for each incident by the NHS.  The details of this granular 
analysis and mapping to GISATs can be seen in table 8 and figure 6. 








GISAT1- Sending an email 31 25.00 G 
GISAT2 - Entering, updating or deleting 
data within a system, file or document 
5 4.03 D 
GISAT3 - Posting an item or information 42 33.87 E 
GISAT4 - Configuring a system 1 0.81 C 
GISAT5 - Administering a system 0 0.00 D 
GISAT6 - Scanning a document 1 0.81 E 
GISAT7 - Printing a document 1 0.81 D 
GISAT8 - Providing information verbally 2 1.61 D 
GISAT9 - Delivering information or 
equipment  
2 1.61 E 
GISAT10 - Filing or sorting information 3 2.42 E 
GISAT11 - Reading or checking an email, 
file, document or item 
0 0.00 G 
GISAT12 - Safeguarding information or 
equipment 
22 17.74 E 
GISAT13 – Destroying information or 
equipment 
6 4.84 D 
GISAT14 – Accessing a location or 
environment 
0 0.00 D 
GISAT15 - Faxing information 2 1.61 D 
GISAT16 - Sharing or handing over 
information or equipment in person 
6 4.84 G 
Table 8 - Mapping of NHS SIRI 2 incidents to GISATs and association with HEART GTTs 
 
Figure 6 - Mapping of NHS SIRI 2 incidents to GISATs 
Once the NHS SIRI level 2 incidents had been mapped to the GISATs it was possible to create 
a conceptual mapping to the HEART GTTs.  The mapping can be seen in table 8.  In addition 
the volumes of each selected GTTs that have been mapped to the Q3 2017 SIRI level 2 
incidents can be seen below.  It was established that none of the published incidents were able 
to be mapped to GTTs A, B, F, H or M. 
 
GTT Count Percentage 
C 1 0.8 
D 16 12.9 
E 70 56.45 
G 37 29.83 
 
Table 9 – HEART GTT mapping to 
NHS SIRI level 2 incidents 
Figure 7 – HEART GTT mapping to 
NHS SIRI level 2 incidents 
 
5. Discussion 
Following analysis of the published data it was identified that 64% of reported incidents across 
all sectors were likely to be as a result of human error, which aligns to the research published 

















by (Alavi et al., 2016; Stewart and Jürjens, 2017).  In addition a further 27% could also 
possibly be as a result of human error.  Therefore, the analysis found that 91% of data security 
incidents reported to the ICO could possibly have been as a result of human error suggesting 
actual rates of human error related information security incidents is higher than currently 
understood by the information security community. These high volumes of possible human 
error information security incidents align to the proportions of human failure that led to 
accidents in the safety field (Lacey, 2010).  This supports the view that the established root 
cause methods utilised within the safety field would demonstrate a higher proportion of human 
error behind current information security incident and breach events than currently recognised.  
Each of the 148 reported NHS SIRI level 2 incidents and associated details were analysed and 
it was identified that 124 (84%) of the most serious NHS personal data security incidents 
pertained to human error which again aligns to published research (Asai and Hakizabera, 
2010).   
Following analysis of the published NHS SIRI level 2 incidents it was identified that the most 
common general information security affecting task was postage of information followed by 
the use of email showing that focus should be applied to external sharing and communication 
of information.  The analysis of the same incidents against the HEART GTTs found that the 
most common generic task type associated with information security incidents is a routine, 
highly-practiced, rapid task involving relatively low level of skill.      
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
In conclusion, it has been identified that the actual volumes of personal data breaches and 
information security incidents are greater than currently understood by the information 
security community.  Therefore, in order to reduce the volumes of breaches and incidents the 
information security field should understand applied human reliability analysis techniques 
applied within the safety field.  The application, and adaptation, of methods of working 
applied within the safety field will enable the underlying root causes of human error to be 
understood and acted upon, which will reduce future volumes of information security 
incidents and breaches.  In addition, organisations should focus on routine operational tasks 
performed by employees that involve the external sharing or communication of confidential or 
personal data. 
We will be continuing our research into the feasibility of human reliability analysis within the 
information security field including publishing associated 12 months feasibility studies, which 
have been undertaken within public and private sector organisations.  In addition, HEART will 
be adapted to produce an Information Security Core Human Error Causes (IS-CHEC) product, 
which will be developed as a key element of the ongoing empirical action research. 
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